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The Odd Couple: Stadium Naming Rights Mitigating 
the Public-Private Stadium Finance Debate  
Christopher B. Carbot1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
They'll arrive at your door as innocent as children, longing for the 
past. Of course, we won't mind if you look around, you'll say. It's only 
$20 per person. They'll pass over the money without even thinking 
about it: for it is money they have and peace they lack. And they'll 
walk out to the bleachers; sit in shirtsleeves on a perfect afternoon. 
They'll find they have reserved seats somewhere along one of the base-
lines, where they sat when they were children and cheered their he-
roes. And they'll watch the game and it'll be as if they dipped them-
selves in magic waters. The memories will be so thick they'll have to 
brush them away from their faces. People will come, Ray. . . . People 
will most definitely come.2 
Former roommates cheering wildly in the student section in March.  
Breezy summer afternoons spent with grandchildren in the outfield bleach-
ers.  Coworkers holding tailgate meetings on Sundays in November.  Few 
things in society can better bring together individuals who otherwise have 
nothing in common.  The relationships created between sports teams and 
their home cities are difficult to rationalize: whether it is the NFL’s New 
Orleans Saints spearheading a city’s rebirth in the wake of a devastating 
natural disaster,3 or a sleepy Midwestern town living and dying each week 
with its high school or college basketball teams’ fate,4 sports teams and their 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Copyright 2009 by Christopher B. Carbot, all rights reserved.  2009 J.D. Candidate, Florida 
International University College of Law.  The author would like to thank Alicia Carbot, Fernando Car-
bot, and Charmelle Garcia for their support and guidance during law school and beyond.  Many thanks 
as well to Professor Andre Smith, Professor Ediberto Roman, and Vannessa Ortiz for their advice and 
tutelage throughout this project.  
 2 FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989). 
 3 See ALLEN DONNES, PATRON SAINTS: HOW THE SAINTS GAVE NEW ORLEANS A REASON TO 
BELIEVE (2007). 
 4 See generally JOHN FEINSTEIN, THE LAST AMATEURS: PLAYING FOR GLORY AND HONOR IN 
DIVISION I COLLEGE BASKETBALL (Back Bay Books 2001) (chronicling the NCAA’s Patriot League, a 
division of obscure programs in terms of national recognition); ADRIAN WOJNAROWSKI, THE MIRACLE 
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cities often form a uniquely symbiotic bond, with the identity of one re-
flected in the other.  Indeed, some would suggest that were it not for the 
presence of sports teams, some cities would be relative unknowns in the 
American landscape.  As one professional sports team supporter has stated, 
“You can have Disney World and every major attraction, but if you don’t 
have a team, in the eyes of the world you’re not a big league city.”5 
These relationships obviously could not be possible without a venue 
for these events to take place.  As such, the stadiums6 in which contests 
occur play an integral role in the experience.7  Some venues transcend the 
teams themselves, attaining the status of a veritable sports Mecca even 
when their tenants experience stretches of futility.8  This is particularly true 
of many older facilities, their venerable facades evoking memories of eras 
gone by.  As one noted sports broadcaster eloquently remarked:  
No such awe or sense of landscape was generated by the multisport, 
artificial turf clones that blighted baseball’s landscape in the 1960’s 
and 70’s.  They were impersonal and nondescript; soulless, with no 
suggestion of history, no sense of place.  Baseball’s best move of the 
past decade has been to spurn them by building new “old” ballparks . . 
. .  Of course, they can’t carry the history of an Ebbets or Forbes Field, 
and in some cases I wouldn’t want to defend the way they were fi-
nanced, but at least they pay tribute to the game . . . .”9 
These facilities, often strategically integrated into the city’s downtown 
districts or other major urban arteries, can sometimes become more recog-
nizable than buildings far more essential to the city’s daily operations.  The 
special ones become destinations unto themselves, mainstays on casual 
                                                                                                                           
OF ST. ANTHONY: A SEASON WITH COACH BOB HURLEY AND BASKETBALL’S MOST IMPROBABLE 
DYNASTY (Penguin 2006) (addressing the New Jersey’s St. Anthony’s boys basketball team, which 
despite substandard economic support – over 50% of the students’ families live below the poverty line – 
manages to rank among the nation’s best programs).    
 5 See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE SPORTS FRANCHISE GAME: CITIES IN PURSUIT OF SPORTS 
FRANCHISES, EVENTS, STADIUMS, AND ARENAS 7 (1995) (quoting Patrick Williams, who spearheaded 
Orlando’s successful attempt to lure a professional basketball team).  
 6 The author intends the word stadium and its various permutations to encompass stadiums, 
arenas, ballparks, and other sporting venues. 
 7 While the focus of this comment centers on the financing of professional sporting venues, the 
development and maintenance of non-professional sports facilities should not be underestimated, as 
these venues are also common breeding grounds for debates on financing and allocation of funds for 
maintenance.  As the sports industry becomes more commercialized and lucrative, other venues run the 
risk of becoming obsolete and extinct as well.  See, e.g., Israel Gutierrez, Baseball Heaven: Great Mem-
ories Mark Dodgertown’s Final Days, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 9, 2008, at D1 (examining the history 
behind the Holman Stadium in Vero Beach, Florida, the spring training home of MLB’s Los Angeles 
Dodgers from 1953-2008).   
 8 See, e.g., CURT SMITH, STORIED STADIUMS: BASEBALL’S HISTORY THROUGH ITS BALLPARKS, 
166 (Carroll & Graf 2001) (“Wrigley Field has always been more than a stadium.  It is not a place 
merely to watch but to experience and embrace something beyond baseball.”). 
 9 Id. at x-xi (emphasis added). 
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tourists’ itineraries, local residents’ weekend plans, and purists’ “places to 
watch a game before I die” checklists.10 
As impressive as these legendary locales may sound, there is another, 
more negative reality surrounding sports stadia:  they are among the most 
hotly contested and criticized structures erected throughout the United 
States.11  Two of the most increasingly prevalent issues at the intersection of 
law and sports are those of stadium finance,12 and their modern naming 
rights practices.  The public subsidization of these facilities has been of 
particular concern to many legislatures and other policymakers, as well as 
the citizens in the cities where these decisions are to be made.13   
In essence, the crux of the current debate surrounding stadium financ-
ing is that the public too often foots the bill—in many cases the entire 
bill—for the construction of multi-million dollar facilities, the main benefits 
of which are to be reaped by private corporations.14  Rather than construct 
the stadium without taxpayer assistance, corporate sports franchises turn to 
municipalities already having other financial obligations for funding.15  
These points are clearly not without merit, as despite providing a major 
entertainment outlet for the city, a forceful argument can be made that be-
tween a private organization set to reap most of the facility’s financial re-
wards and a municipality already saddled with other fiscal responsibilities, 
the burden of financing a new stadium should fall at the franchise’s feet.  
Paying for the construction of stadiums and arenas has thus proven to be a 
different sort of zero-sum game: any victory by private franchises and lea-
gues formulaically results in a loss for the public sector, and vice-versa, 
while failing to address and remedy the greater issue of finding mutually 
agreeable solutions to the problem.       
                                                                                                                           
 10 See generally JIM GORANT, FANATIC: TEN THINGS ALL SPORTS FANS SHOULD DO BEFORE 
THEY DIE, 148-64 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2007) (a day game at Wrigley Field between the Chicago 
Cubs and Atlanta Braves, the Boston Red Sox’s Opening Day at Fenway Park, and a Green Bay Packers 
game at the frozen tundra of Lambeau Field were among the featured events in the book).  
 11 See, e.g., KEVIN J. DELANEY & RICK ECKSTEIN, PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE STADIUMS: THE 
BATTLE OVER BUILDING SPORTS STADIUMS (2003); see also Brent Bordson, Public Sports Stadium 
Funding: Communities Being Held Hostage by Professional Sports Teams Owners, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 
505 (1998); Todd Senkiewicz, Stadium and Arena Financing: Who Should Pay?, 8 SETON HALL J. 
SPORTS L. 575 (1998). 
 12 Id.;  see also Robert H. Thornburg, Stadium Naming Rights: An Assessment of the Contract and 
Trademark Issues Inherent to Both Professional and Collegiate Stadiums, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 328 
(Spring 2003). 
 13 See DELANEY & ECKSTEIN, supra note 11 (providing an in-depth and well-researched case 
study on stadium financing, including an examination of the delicate and intricate dealings amongst 
policymakers, taxpayers, and franchise owners). 
 14 See Senkiewicz, supra note 11, at 577 (stating “while owners want to reap the benefits asso-
ciated with having a state-of-the-art facility, they have little interest in paying for it themselves.  Today’s 
stadiums and arenas are primarily financed by state and local governments.”). 
 15 Id. (“This is so, despite the fact that public budgets everywhere are tight . . . .”).   
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This comment seeks to address the modern public-private stadium fi-
nancing debate, not in terms of allocating fault to one side or declaring the 
other’s cause to be more compelling, but in exploring  the existence of re-
lief from an unlikely source— one which often draws as much public ire as 
private owners reaching into taxpayer pockets.  Specifically, this piece’s 
main proposal is to tweak current stadium naming rights agreement practic-
es to increase the role of namesake corporations in financing new stadiums 
and arenas.      
Part II of this comment will briefly delineate the history and back-
ground leading up to the stadium construction boom that has occurred over 
the last twenty years, followed by a discussion of the various methods em-
ployed to fund the increasingly more expensive facilities of the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries.16  Particular attention will be given to the public pur-
pose doctrine and tax-exempt bond financing, the two largest pillars of 
modern-day stadium financing.   
The focus will then shift in Part III to another oft-maligned recent 
trend: that of the “corporatization” of stadium naming rights practices, trac-
ing its genesis from the first “corporate” namesake stadium up through the 
1980’s boom of stadium naming rights agreements that still continues to-
day.17  Included in the discussion will be an exploration of the rights, obli-
gations, and other issues arising out of naming rights agreements, including 
trademark, service mark, and exclusivity of use.   
Part IV of the piece will engage in an objective analysis of the argu-
ments on both sides of the stadium finance debate,18 including the potential 
pitfalls surrounding stadium naming rights, and the more intangible factors, 
often city-specific, that inform and shape the debates over stadium financ-
ing.   
Part V will explore the possibility of new approaches to stadium fi-
nancing in an attempt to bridge the gulf between the private and public sec-
tors.  Suggestions in this discussion range from minor alterations of current 
financing practices, to frontier solutions such as this piece’s primary sug-
gestion: increase the role of corporations that seek to gain stadium naming 
rights when it comes time to pay the tab for the facility.19   
II.  A LONG WAY FROM THE SANDLOT: THE FINANCING OF PROFESSIONAL 
SPORTS STADIUMS 
The sporting industry has experienced a sharp increase in growth and 
exposure over the last twenty-five years, both as a recreational spectator’s 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra Part II. 
 17 See infra Part III. 
 18 See infra Part IV. 
 19 See infra Part V. 
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event and a lucrative entertainment and business universe.20  The days of 
being able to hop the fence before the game and watch your favorite player 
are long gone.  By and large, the innocuous innocence of professional 
sports has faded like an old baseball card.    
As a result of the increased competition for revenue and other business 
advantages, the venues in which these games are contested have also come 
to reflect efforts to create a full-scale entertainment experience aimed at 
bringing in more customers and keeping them there while creating larger 
revenue streams in the process.21  At both the collegiate and professional 
levels, quaint, no-frills stadiums like Miami’s Orange Bowl, despite their 
romanticized notions of history and tradition,22 can no longer viably com-
pete in the marketplace with facilities costing upwards of a half-billion dol-
lars to construct.23  As bigger and better facilities now become the gold 
standard (and perhaps even a prerequisite for economic and on-field suc-
cess), the financing costs for these behemoth venues have increased expo-
nentially as well.24  With these increased asking prices come even louder 
questions of how much of the price tag should be slung over the shoulders 
of local and state governments as opposed to private franchises.25   
                                                                                                                           
 20 See, e.g., Richard P. Cole, Law, Sports, and Popular Culture: The Marriage of a Relationship 
Scorned, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 431 (2002); Lindsay J. Rosenthal, From Regulating Organization to 
Multi-Billion Dollar Business: The NCAA is Commercializing the Amateur Competition it has Taken 
Almost a Century to Create, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 321 (2003); Kerry M. Fraas, “Bankers Up!” 
Professional Sports Facility Financing and Other Opportunities for Bank Involvement in Lucrative 
Professional Sports, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 201 (Apr. 1999). 
 21 See Dolphin Stadium, Historic Transformation, http://www.dolphinstadium.com/content 
/architecture.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2008) (explaining that the facility is currently in the midst of a 
massive renovation, the end product of which is expected to be  “a state-of-the-art venue that will 
offer the most inspired and unmatched stadium experience in the world.”  Among the additions are 
interactive exhibits, new restaurants and lounges, upgraded luxury suites, and massive high-
definition television monitors.).   
 22 The Orange Bowl, one of college football’s most historic and storied venues, has long-been 
recognized for its atmosphere and “mystique” throughout the University of Miami’s successful decades 
of the late 20th century.  See, e.g., Randall Mell, Stadium Offers Wonderful Memories, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Nov. 9, 2007, at D1.  
 23 The University of Miami Hurricanes football team, the Orange Bowl’s main tenant, completed 
its final season at the historic facility in 2007.  Rather than complete the extensive renovations required 
to update the facility, beginning August 2008 the Hurricanes began playing their home games at Dolphin 
Stadium.  The Orange Bowl was demolished in 2008, with plans to construct a new state-of-the-art 
ballpark for the Florida Marlins on the site.  See Mike Bianchi, UM Fans, Don’t be Crushed by Orange 
Exit, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 26, 2007, at C1 (arguing that the University of Miami football pro-
gram’s professional-caliber talent over the past twenty-five years has had much more to do with the 
team’s success than the outdated stadium’s “aurora”).   
 24 Andrew H. Goodman, The Public Financing of Professional Sports Stadiums: Policy and 
Practice, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 173, 174 (2002) (“since just 1989, taxpayers have lavished $5.2 billion on 
the four major sports leagues . . . under the guise of stadium financing . . . [t]he cost of construction for 
stadiums opening between 1999 and 2003 alone will total $13.5 billion.”). 
 25 Id.  
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A.  The Stadium Arms Race and the Rise of Public Subsidization 
Professional sports have become an increasingly lucrative universe 
over the last twenty years, as reflected in the revenues of major American 
sports leagues and their constituent franchises.  The year 2006 saw Major 
League Baseball teams rake in a then-record $496 million,26 and the league 
as a whole generated a staggering $5.8 billion of revenue in 2008, despite 
many teams feeling the effects of an economic downturn.27  Franchise val-
ues have reached particularly astronomical heights in professional football, 
where the National Football League’s clubs are consistently the most valua-
ble franchises in all of professional sports, and some individual teams are 
worth nearly $1 billion.28  While factors such as more far-reaching broad-
cast contracts have played important roles in this increasing popularity, 
profitable stadium situations have undoubtedly had an immense impact as 
well.29  In fact, some suggest that new stadiums and their greater revenue 
streams play the biggest role in increasing franchise value.   
 1.  A Brief Timeline of Stadium Evolution 
Today’s multimillion dollar state-of-the-art facilities, with high-
definition monitors, luxury suites, and innumerable concession options, are 
a far cry from the humble beginnings of sporting venues.30  The early twen-
tieth century saw mostly baseball stadiums crop up across the country in 
what became the “classic” or “jewel box” design era,31 with the ballparks 
often quirkily designed to fit into existing parcels of land.32  Many stadiums 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Kurt Badenhausen, Michael K. Ozanian, & Christina Settimi, Baseball’s Big Bucks, 
FORBES.COM, Apr. 19, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/04/19/baseball-team-valuations-07mlb-
cz_kb_0419baseballintro.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 27 See Michael K. Ozanian & Kurt Badenhausen, Baseball’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES.COM, 
Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/22/yankees-mets-baseball-values-09-business-sports-
intro.html (last visited May 6, 2009). 
 28 See Forbes Franchise Values, ESPN SPORTS BUSINESS, http://espn.go.com/sportsbusiness/s/ 
forbes.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008) (providing a list of most valuable franchises).  The NFL’s Wash-
ington Redskins are the most valuable franchise in all of professional sports with a $1.1 billion valua-
tion.  Id.  Overall, the NFL’s 32 teams accounted for 32 of the 33 highest-valued franchises, all with a 
value of over $500 million.  Id.  The only non-NFL team in the top 33 is the New York Yankees of 
MLB, at #16.Id. 
 29 Adam Safir, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Politics of Financing Sports Stadium Con-
struction, 13 J. L. & POL. 937, 938 (1997) (noting the impact of favorable stadium leases on skyrocket-
ing value of NFL and MLB franchises). 
 30 The origins of the stadium trace back to ancient Greece, home of the first Olympics over 2,000 
years ago.  Perhaps the most famous however, even centuries after its initial construction, is the Roman 
Colosseum, still today a great heirloom of structures designed specifically for the public to gather for 
entertainment.  Believed to be constructed around 70 A.D., the Colosseum hosted innumerable gladia-
torial battles and other public exhibitions, ranging from dramatic performances to animal hunts.  
 31 See SMITH, supra note 8, at 55-262 (discussing the classic era of baseball parks from 1909 to 
1961). 
 32 Id. at 55 (“each fit into an urban parcel, which made for some unique angles”).  
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from this era came to be known as “the contemporary equivalent of cathe-
drals,”33  such as Yankee Stadium with its white picket façade evoking the 
ancient Roman Colosseum.34   
During the 1950’s and 60’s, many cities obtained second and third ma-
jor sports franchises, which raised concerns about financial and land availa-
bility and ultimately led to the rise of multipurpose venues.35  These facili-
ties, which could aptly accommodate two franchises, were erected with 
increasing frequency throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, coinciding with the 
increase in municipally-funded stadiums, one major exception being the 
former Joe Robbie Stadium.  Financed by then-Miami Dolphins owner Joe 
Robbie,36 the stadium was at the time considered one of the finest in the 
country,37 particularly revolutionary for its inclusion of a club level and 
luxury suites, the revenues from which were used to repay the bonds the 
facility was constructed with.38  The Stadium was particularly innovative for 
its use of luxury suites as revenue stream, a groundbreaking phenomenon in 
professional sports that came to be standard-fare for football stadiums by 
the end of the century.39   
A major selling point of multi-sport facilities was the cost efficient 
manner in which they could house two major franchises, thus saving the 
public millions of dollars in additional construction costs40 while making 
those cities attractive candidates for additional professional sports franchis-
es.  As such, throughout the 1970s “highway accessible, multipurpose sta-
dium[s]” became the major sporting facility trend, with new parks being 
constructed in cities including Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Philadelphia.41  
These venues were not without their critics, however, who pejoratively re-
ferred to the blandly designed, steel and concrete structures as “cookie cut-
                                                                                                                           
 33 Id. at 65. 
 34 Id. at 137. 
 35 Id. at 302 (suggesting that the rise of professional football in the 1960’s and 70’s contributed to 
the shift toward generic, multi-sport facilities during that era: “One by one, football stadiums raided 
baseball’s soul.”). 
 36 See Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in the National Football 
League, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 489 n. 120 (1997). 
 37 See Dolphin Stadium History, available at http://www.dolphinstadium.com/content/history.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 38 Id. (“Inclusion of a Club Level, along with Executive Suites, helped to finance the con-
struction of the stadium.  Season ticket holders committed to long-term agreements and in return 
they received first-class amenities in a state-of-the-art facility which is still used as a model for new 
facilities across the country.”).  In keeping with the multi-sport stadium movement, Joe Robbie 
Stadium was designed with the foresight to accommodate a future professional baseball franchise, a 
move that proved visionary when the expansion Marlins began play in 1993.  Id. 
 39 SHROPSHIRE, supra note 5, at 9 (explaining that by 1999, the only NFL stadium without luxury 
suites was Robert F. Kennedy Stadium in Washington, D.C.).  
 40 Goodman, supra note 24, at 184. 
 41 DELANEY & ECKSTEIN, supra note 11, at 156. 
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ters.”42  One top player of the era noted that “[w]hen I’m at bat, I can’t tell 
whether I’m in Cincinnati, Philly, or St. Louis.”43  Another remarked 
“[y]ou’d be kind to say [multisport stadiums] had the charm of a parking 
garage.”44  Nonetheless, the proliferation of multipurpose facilities contin-
ued relatively unobstructed through the 1980’s. 
Beginning in the early 1990’s, the business aspect of professional 
sports entered an era of unprecedented success, leaving many multipurpose 
stadiums in the unenviable position of being relatively new, yet already 
outdated by virtue of having caught the tail-end of the multisport venue 
wave.  Record ticket sales, league expansion, and other factors combined to 
create a booming industry for franchises, sponsors, and other affiliated enti-
ties: in the span of less than fifteen years in some cases, stadiums were be-
coming obsolete, particularly those that housed multiple franchises and 
lacked sport-specific and luxury amenities.45  The sport-specific stadium 
became the hottest commodity for franchises, a symbol of having arrived at 
the pinnacle of sporting entertainment.  In the eyes of many owners, by the 
late 1990’s obtaining a new facility tailored to the particular sport’s and 
franchise’s needs became a necessity in order to assure viability as a fran-
chise.     
Many professional teams often seek new facilities to gain more favor-
able lease agreements and other revenue-generating streams, much to the 
chagrin of public taxpayers who consider current facilities to be adequate.46  
With this increase in stadium and arena construction, taxpayer involvement 
increased as well, a trend which prompted legislative proposals aimed at 
curbing the increasingly large public subsidizations. 
2.  Legislative Proposals to Curb Public Subsidization: The Stadium 
Financing and Relocation Act of 1999 
The Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999 
(SFFRA)47 was originally introduced by Senator Arlen Specter to the Senate 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See generally SMITH, supra note 8, at 301-464.  
 43 Id. at 301. 
 44 Id. at 302. 
 45 See Goodman, supra note 24, at 184 (addressing owners’ “desire for obtaining optimal seating 
capacity for individual franchises, which translates into larger revenues,” resulting in “[e]arlier multi-
purpose stadiums [becoming] obsolete, too small for football, and too large for baseball . . . The return 
to the single-purpose stadium allows a football team to have an ideal 70,000-seat stadium, and a baseball 
team to seat an ideal 45,000 spectators.”). 
 46 See Gregory W. Fox, Public Finance and the West Side Stadium: The Future of Stadium Subsi-
dies in New York, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 477, 491 (2005) (discussing the “less-than-optimal revenues” 
generated by the New York Jets’ current stadium situation). 
 47 See Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999, S. 952, 106th Cong. (1999), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:S.952: (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
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on May 4, 1999.48  The purpose of the SFFRA was “[t]o expand an antitrust 
exemption applicable to professional sports leagues and to require, as a 
condition of such an exemption, participation by professional football and 
major league baseball sports leagues in the financing of certain stadium 
construction activities, and for other purposes.”49  In other words, the 
SFFRA’s main goal was to increase league responsibility and participation 
towards the financial commitments new stadiums require by setting aside a 
percentage of broadcast revenues, in exchange for increased antitrust pro-
tection for all four major American professional sports leagues (NBA, NFL, 
MLB, and NHL).50  Additionally, Senator Specter sought to prevent fran-
chises from relocating if a new stadium deal could not be struck, as clubs 
often attempt to coerce cities into granting—and paying for—a new facility 
under the threat of relocation.51  As per the SFFRA, antitrust laws would not 
apply where there are joint agreements: 
by or among persons engaging in or conducting the organized profes-
sional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by 
which any league of clubs participating in that professional sport sells 
or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of the member clubs 
of that league in the sponsored telecasting of the games of that profes-
sional sport that are engaged in or conducted by those member clubs;52 
Of course, the carrot of expanded antitrust exemptions did not come 
without a fair exchange, in the form of leagues placing 10% of revenues 
generated from broadcasts in a trust to be used for the financing of new 
stadiums: 
The exemption under subsection (a) for a joint agreement described in 
subsection (a)(2)(A) shall apply, with respect to a football league or 
major league baseball league only if the league of football or major 
league baseball clubs involved-- 
(A) agrees— 
* * * 
(ii) not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of the Stadium 
Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999, to establish a special 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Marc D. Oram, The Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999, 2 VA. J. 
SPORTS & L. 184, 202-03 (Spring 2000).  
 51 Zachary A. Phelps, Stadium Construction for Professional Sports: Reversing the Inequities 
Through Tax Incentives, 18 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL COMMENT. 981, 999-1000 (2004); see also Daniel S. 
Mason, Appropriate Opportunism or Bad Business Practice?  Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, and the 
Franchise Relocation Issue, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 399 (1997).   
 52 Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999, S. 952, 106th Cong. (1999), availa-
ble at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:S.952: (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
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trust fund into which the league will deposit an amount equal to 10 
percent of the amounts received under that joint agreement for the sale 
or transfer of the rights in sponsored telecasting of the games of the 
professional sport of that league in the United States, on the condition 
that any funds in the trust fund that are not obligated during the 10-
year period beginning on the date on which those funds are deposited 
in that trust fund shall be withdrawn from that trust fund and treated as 
gross revenues of the league; 
(iii) to use the amounts in the trust fund established under clause (ii) 
only for financing, in accordance with this section, the construction or 
renovation of playing facilities from which games of the teams of that 
league will be televised; and 
(iv) to make available to a local governmental entity, upon request of 
that entity, from the amounts in the trust fund established under clause 
(ii), assistance for the cost of the construction or renovation of playing 
facilities to be used by a member club in that league (if that construc-
tion or renovation was not completed prior to the date of introduction 
of the Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999), up 
to a maximum of one-half of that cost . . . 53 
Of the utmost importance to the expanded antitrust protection afforded 
to major professional sports leagues were the leagues’ ability to more strict-
ly control franchise relocation, specifically to deny a member club the right 
to transfer to a new location.54  Naturally, the proposed bill received heavy 
opposition from the NFL and MLB, which tend to be the leagues whose 
respective constituent members call for sport-specific facilities.55  Chief 
among the leagues’ arguments were concerns that smaller market teams 
would be disproportionately affected;56 and, that requiring 10 percent of 
broadcast revenues to be put toward new stadium financing would be both 
unnecessary and insufficient to achieve the desired purpose of alleviating 
public subsidization.57  Ultimately, the SFFRA failed to be enacted into law 
despite the potential impact it would have had on current stadium-finance 
practices.  The Senate adjourned in September 1999 without a proper vote 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. at § 1(b)(1)(A). 
 54 See Oram, supra note 50, at 202. 
 55 Goodman, supra note 24, at 184 (contrasting hockey and basketball, which “have the same 
ideal seating capacity” and are thus more economically efficient co-tenants, to football and baseball, 
where markedly different schedules and ideal seating capacities result in less economically-efficient 
facility sharing). 
 56 Id. at 205-08. (noting that small and medium market teams rely more heavily on broadcast 
revenues than their large market counterparts).  
 57 Id. (the NFL argued that the league already contributes heavily to the construction of its new 
stadiums, while MLB argued that 10% of its broadcasting rights would not provide a significant contri-
bution to the financing of new stadiums). 
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on SFFRA’s future, thereby effectively deciding to deny the Act legal 
force.58  
3.  Financing the Construction Of Stadiums  and Other Sporting Venues 
As bigger and better facilities now become standard fare, debates as to 
how such venues should be financed often turn ugly, with franchises often 
threatening relocation and leagues threatening contraction.59  Financing the 
costs of modern-day sporting venues goes far beyond rustling under the 
public’s couch for loose change, or conversely, the franchise owner private-
ly footing the bill as was common practice in the early twentieth century.  
Indeed, the form and function of funding methods vary wildly, with differ-
ing levels of support and effectiveness.  As will be discussed, the two major 
pillars of modern-day stadium financing are the public purpose doctrine and 
tax-exempt bond financing.  Subsection (a) below will engage in a thorough 
analysis of the public purpose doctrine and tax-exempt bond financing 
structures under Internal Revenue Code § 141, as well as a roadmap of how 
franchise owners today navigate the public subsidization waters.  Subsec-
tion (b) will address other common stadium financing methods, including 
various large-scale taxation approaches which are often employed to sup-
plement bond disbursements. 
a.  The Public Purpose Doctrine and Bond-Issuance Financing  
i.  The Public Purpose 
  
By far the most common method of financing new stadiums today is 
via issuance of various bonds.  This method, however, is typically one of 
the most maligned avenues of paying for stadiums, due to a franchise’s abil-
ity to secure financing for a new facility at greatly discounted rates.  Fran-
chise owners favor the use of municipal bond financing because such an 
approach typically results in tax exemption, largely by virtue of falling 
within the ambit of the “public purpose doctrine.”60  As one scholar has 
colorfully described it, the essential inquiry of the public purpose doctrine 
as applied to sports stadium financing is whether “stadiums provide a sig-
                                                                                                                           
 58 See S. 952 legislative history, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d106: 
SN00952:@@@X (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 59 See Bordson, supra note 11 (providing insightful commentary of how strenuous stadium fi-
nancing negotiations can become).  
 60 The public purpose doctrine is rooted in the economic theory that federal subsidies are war-
ranted where a public purpose is to be served.  See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 24, at 179-80; see also 
Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Public Finance of Sports Stadia: Controversial but Permissible…Time for 
Federal Income Tax Relief for State and Local Taxpayers, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 135 (2002).    
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nificant benefit to the public that warrants massive subsidies,”61 so as to 
“ensure that taxpayer dollars are being spent on projects that benefit the 
public, not private individuals and corporations.”62  The answer to this in-
quiry as to whether sports stadiums serve an adequate public purpose is 
often in the affirmative, as will be explained below.  
While the public purpose doctrine has its roots in curbing public aid to 
the railroad industry,63 its applicability to the public subsidization of sports 
stadiums and other facilities has been asserted since the early twentieth 
century.64  In what is perhaps the earliest case involving a public purpose 
challenge to the subsidization of a professional sports facility, Meyer v. City 
of Cleveland65 involved a taxpayer challenging a voter-approved bond is-
suance of $2,500,000 to construct a fireproof stadium on the lakefront.66  
Despite the taxpayer’s concerns that such a debt was to be incurred largely 
for the benefit of the Cleveland Indians baseball team, the Meyer court con-
cluded that “[g]enerally speaking, anything calculated to promote the edu-
cation, the recreation or the pleasure of the public is to be included within 
the legitimate domain of public purposes.”67  The court reasoned that in 
addition to baseball games, the stadium would be used for “pageants, patri-
otic celebrations, playground festivals . . . civic demonstrations . . . outdoor 
opera, band concerts, musical festivals . . . expositions, and baseball, foot-
ball, boxing, wrestling, and other athletic contests,”68 all of which justified 
subsidization by virtue of the “the power of cities and towns to maintain 
institutions which educate and instruct as well as please and amuse their 
inhabitants.”69  The broad, sweeping nature of Meyer’s precedent continued 
to echo throughout the twentieth century, as evidenced by subsequent chal-
lenges to public stadium subsidization and appurtenant developments,70 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Fox, supra note 46, at 507. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports Teams— A Constitutional Disgrace: The 
Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and State Constitutional Enactments Prohibiting Public Subsidies to 
Private Corporations, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 393, 394-97 (1999) (explaining that the historical rationale for 
prohibiting public aid to private corporations arises out of the millions of dollars indebted to railroads 
for the benefit of private railroad companies). 
 64 See Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 171 N.E. 606 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 607. 
 68 Id. at 608. 
 69 Id. at 607. 
 70 See, e.g., Anaheim v. Michel, 259 Cal. App. 2d 835 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (addressing 
eminent domain and public use issues regarding the development of a parking facility for Anaheim 
Stadium); see also Ginsberg v. Denver, 436 P. 2d 685, 688 (Colo. 1968) (upholding city’s bond financ-
ing of a stadium for the Denver Broncos football team without first submitting the proposal to taxpayer 
voting); Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm’n, 270 N.W. 2d 749, 754 (Minn. 1978) (“the 
acquisition or construction of a stadium to be used in part by one or more professional sports teams 
constitutes a public purpose for which public expenditures could be legally undertaken”). 
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with an increasingly broad construction of “public purpose”71 facilitating 
the development of professional sports stadiums throughout the nation.       
ii.  Capitalizing on Tax-Exempt Bond Issuances 
The opportunities for stadium subsidies to qualify for tax-exemptions 
became more abundant with the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 
1968 (RECA), which expanded the scope of the public purpose doctrine.72  
Particularly, RECA exempted certain sports facilities deemed to be quasi-
public in nature, which included stadiums, ski slopes, and golf courses.73  
Under RECA, sports facilities could gain the tax-exempt finance bond ben-
efits if two requirements were met: (1) if professional sports teams “used 
more than 25% of the stadium’s services,” and (2) “when more than 25% of 
the debt service was retired with revenues generated by the stadium through 
rents, ticket taxes, and shares of profits from concessions and parking facili-
ties.”74        
The Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) promulgation of the 1986 Tax 
Code made it more difficult for private-sector franchise owners to take ad-
vantage of the tax benefits afforded to them for stadium construction under 
the old regime.  These changes came much to the relief of many in the pub-
lic sector, who had become increasingly frustrated with franchise owners 
benefiting from tax breaks for stadiums that in theory served a public pur-
pose, but in practice catered largely to private interests of the teams which 
called the stadiums home.  Among the changes to the Code were the reduc-
tions of the required percentages for tax exemption from 25 percent to 10 
percent, while requiring that the bond issuance in question pass only one of 
either the use of proceeds or securities interest tests.75  Thus, under the cur-
rent regime, bonds for stadium construction attain tax-exempt status if ei-
ther (1) the sports team uses less than 10% of the stadium’s services, or (2) 
less than 10 percent of the debt service on the bonds is secured by private 
business.76    
 
iii.  Navigating the Waters to Achieve Public-Subsidization   
Success  
 
As illustrated above, the public purpose doctrine and RECA’s 10 per-
cent tests are critical armaments in the professional sports franchise’s tool-
                                                                                                                           
 71 Ginsberg, 436 P. 2d at 688 (“The modern trend is to expand and liberally construe the term 
"public purpose."). 
 72 See Goodman, supra note 24, at 179-80.   
 73 Id. at 180.   
 74 Id. at 181.   
 75 Id. at 182-83. 
 76 I.R.C. § 141 (1986); see also Safir, supra note 29, at 937.   
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box when it comes to building new stadiums; and franchise owners must 
tread carefully to effectively reap the benefits of such doctrines.  I.R.C. § 
141 is of great importance to stadium finance, particularly subsection 
(b)(2), which delineates the private security or payment test.77  Since § 141 
classifies a private activity bond as any bond which meets both the private 
business use and private security or payment tests,78 and bonds issued for 
stadiums will almost invariably fail to meet the private business use test,79 
avoiding classification as a private activity bond to achieve tax-exempt sta-
tus typically hinges on the private security or payment test.  Thus, to gain 
tax-exempt status for their bond issuances, franchise owners seek to meet 
the subsection § 141(b)(2) requirement by maintaining the percentage of 
bond amounts secured with payments of property from a private use below 
the 10 percent threshold.80   
I.R.S. § 141 and the public purpose doctrine depend heavily on one 
another in meeting the requirements of § 141(b)(2).  To gain tax-exempt 
interest status, team owners consistently seek the favor of local and state 
municipalities to secure municipally-backed bonds, as opposed to backing 
the bonds with revenue generated by the new facility,81 since such an ar-
rangement would fail both § 141 tests.  It is at this juncture where taxpayers 
often challenge the legitimacy of the stadium’s status as a public facility 
within the scope of the doctrine.82  As evidenced by cases as early as Mey-
er,83 and more recently Poe v. Hillsborough County,84 challenges to the legi-
timacy of backing professional sports stadiums with public purpose and 
public facility justifications often fail.85  The general defense to the chal-
lenge of subsidizing such sports facilities with public bonds generally ad-
vances an argument for the recreational, entertainment, economic, and other 
benefits professional sports stadiums generate for the public— an argument 
                                                                                                                           
 77 I.R.S. § 141(b)(2) (“except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an issue meets the test of 
this paragraph if more than 10 percent of the proceeds of such issue is (under the terms of such issue or 
any underlying arrangement) directly or indirectly—(A) secured by any interest in (i) property used for 
a private business use, or (ii) payments in respect of such property, or (B) to be derived from payments 
(whether or not to the issuer) in respect of property, or borrowed money, used or to be used for a private 
business use.”). 
 78 I.R.S. § 141(a) (“. . . ‘private activity bond’ means any bond issued as part of an issue (1) which 
meets (A) the private business use test . . . and (B) the private security or payment test . . . .”).  
 79 See Fraas, supra note 20, at 208-09 (“most facilities fail this private use test because the portion 
of the revenues from the stadium activities accruing to the private teams and owners is above the thre-
shold level.”). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 209 (“sports team owners seek municipality-backed bonds, instead of backing the facility 
with the facility’s own revenues, in order to classify the facility as public, not private, use property”). 
 82 See infra pp. 539-41. 
 83 See supra note 20. 
 84 Poe, 695 So. 2d at 672 (addressing the constitutionality of publicly-subsidized bonds in the 
construction of a new professional football stadium for the Tampa Bay Buccaneers). 
 85 See supra note 24; see also supra pp. 533-34. 
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that typically succeeds in preserving public aid for new stadium construc-
tion.86   
Moreover, extending the public purpose doctrine’s reach was the Poe 
court’s reasoning that “a bond issue does not violate article VII, section 10 
so long as the project serves a ‘paramount public purpose,’ and any benefits 
to private parties from the project are incidental.”87  Thus, a private sports 
franchise’s deriving great financial and competitive benefit from playing in 
a new stadium is often deemed as incidental to the facility’s greater purpose 
to serve the public as a center for entertainment.  The Poe court also sug-
gested that a stadium should not be precluded from being built with public 
dollars simply because the public purpose service it provides generates pri-
vate profit:    
The mere fact that someone engaged in private business for private 
gain will be benefited by every public improvement undertaken by the 
government or a governmental agency, should not and does not de-
prive such improvement of its public character or detract from the fact 
that it primarily serves a public purpose.  An incidental use or benefit 
which may be of some private benefit is not the proper test in deter-
mining whether or not the project is for a public purpose.88 
Thus, once a legislative body determines a new stadium to be benefi-
cial to the public, owners of private professional sports teams currently en-
joy a comfortable degree of latitude in attaining publicly-subsidized bonds 
for the construction of new home facilities, despite heavy criticism and op-
position from actual members of the general public. 
b.  State and Local Tax Approaches 
In addition to bond issuances and public purpose justifications, mod-
ern stadium finance methods also rely a great deal on a multitude of tax 
implementations.  By far the most ubiquitous are general sales taxes, as 
such a tax can be levied in just about any city in America, and does not re-
quire some sort of niche market industry to generate revenue as other tax-
based revenue efforts do.89  While not as productive an approach for all ci-
                                                                                                                           
 86 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 896 (Penn. 1966) (suggesting that 
public projects may include “anything calculated to promote the education, the recreation or the pleasure 
of the public.”); Ginsburg, 436 P.2d at 688-89 ("Municipal corporations are not limited to providing for 
the material necessities of their citizens.  Generally speaking, anything calculated to promote the educa-
tion, the recreation or the pleasure of the public is to be included within the legitimate domain of public 
purposes.").    
 87 Poe, 695 So. 2d at 675 (emphasis added). 
 88 Id. at 677 (citing State v. Bd. of Control, 66 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 1953)). 
 89 See generally Senkiewicz, supra note 11, at 585 (explaining that one of the most successful 
examples of general sales taxes levied for stadium finance is Arlington Texas, which raised $135 million 
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ties, those with strong tourism industries often find that hotel and other 
tourist taxes provide a reliable means of generating revenue while diverting 
most of the burden away from its local, resident taxpayers.90          
In addition to tourist and general sales taxes, many cities also imple-
ment various versions of alcohol, tobacco, and lottery taxes— sometimes 
pejoratively termed “sin taxes”— in their revenue generating plans.91  While 
these taxes are imposed on only the fraction of the local population that 
consumes such commodities and thus far less “fair” than some other taxes, 
they tend to be implemented with little political resistance, “likely because 
of implications of moral correctness.”92   
III.  WELCOME TO (YOUR NAME HERE!): THE PROLIFERATION OF STADIUM 
NAMING RIGHTS  
Just as stadium icons such as the ivy walls of Wrigley Field, or (to a 
less historic degree) the Buccaneer pirate ship at Tampa’s Raymond James 
Stadium often become local or national symbols, the same can be said of 
the names of the stadiums themselves, whose nicknames often become part 
of the city’s vernacular.  Fans of sports teams typically view the team and 
stadium as being theirs, and both in the case of professional and collegiate 
venues, coin familial nicknames that often supersede the stadium’s official 
name in the city’s popular culture.93  Thus, deciding what to name a sporting 
venue can be just as important as determining its location or design.  Sec-
tion A below will provide a brief introduction to what is often considered 
the precursor to modern corporate stadium naming practices.  Section B 
will follow with a look into the boom of corporate stadium naming rights 
agreements, which interestingly coincided with the end of the multi-purpose 
                                                                                                                           
for the Ballpark at Arlington with a 0.5% local sales tax increase);  see also Goodman, supra note 24, at 
194. 
 90 See Senkiewicz, supra note 11, at 585 (explaining that the cities which have made use of tourist 
taxes include Phoenix, Nashville, Miami, and Orlando).     
 91 Goodman, supra note 24, at 196. 
 92 Id. at 186 (explaining that Baltimore’s Oriole Park at Camden Yards, considered one of the 
pinnacles of modern stadium design, was financed in part with lottery proceeds); see also Senkiewicz, 
supra note 11, at 586. 
 93 See, e.g., Indians Record-Setting Sellout Streak Over, USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 2001, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/indians/2001-04-04-sellout.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2007) 
(Cleveland’s Jacobs Field came to be popularly known as “The Jake” as the facility rose to prominence 
along with the MLB’s Indians during the mid-to-late 1990’s.  From June 1995 to April 2001, “The Jake” 
welcomed 455 consecutive sellout crowds.  From the park’s opening until April 2001, 496 of the In-
dian’s 526 regular season games were sellouts.).  But see 100 Things about 100 Years of Gator Football, 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2006/08/27/Sports/100_ 
things_about_100_.shtml (last visited Apr. 5, 2008) (Conversely, “The Swamp” has become the most 
popular name for the University of Florida football team’s home field.  Originally named Florida Field 
and later rededicated Ben Hill Griffin Stadium in honor of University benefactors, it is nonetheless most 
popularly known as “The Swamp” after former coach Steve Spurrier likened a swamp to being a friend-
ly home for alligators but not other creatures.).   
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venue era and the emergence of single sport stadiums.  Section C will look 
into the “nuts and bolts” of stadium naming rights agreements, exploring 
the contractual, intellectual property, and other legal issues inherent in those 
agreements.  
A.  The “Corporatization” of Stadium Naming Rights  
Corporate entities have not missed the boat with respect to recognizing 
the lucrative potential of association with a professional sports league, fran-
chise, or event.  This has lead to a boom in the practice of corporate naming 
rights deals, much to the despair of “purist” sports fans.  Although not a 
new concept—in addition to the unintentionally corporate-named Wrigley 
Field,94 Anheuser-Busch gained the naming rights to the MLB St. Louis 
Cardinals’ home field in the 1960’s95—the “corporatization”96 of stadium 
naming rights took off in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.  The tipping 
point for the corporatization phenomenon occurred when Great Western 
Bank purchased the naming rights to what was then the Los Angeles Fo-
rum, transforming it into the Great Western Forum, which played host to 
the Los Angeles Lakers during their “Showtime” dynasty era.  The dot-com 
boom of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s further stoked the mad dash to 
secure the most lucrative corporate naming rights agreements available.      
B.  The Naming Rights Deal 
Stadium naming rights deals bring with them a plethora of rights, obli-
gations, and other legal implications involving various bodies of law, par-
ticularly those of intellectual property and contracts.  This section will ex-
plore some of the legal issues inherent to naming rights agreements.  Per-
                                                                                                                           
 94 Early choices in stadium naming typically reflected a team (such as Yankee Stadium) or an 
individual who played a critical role in building the facility or franchise (such as Comiskey Park, home 
to the Chicago White Sox from 1910-1991, named after White Sox founder and owner Charles Com-
iskey).  Ironically, one of these early instances of naming a facility after a franchise pioneer inadvertent-
ly also became the first seed in the development of corporate naming rights practices.  Wrigley Field, 
one of the most famous venues in all of sports and home to the Chicago Cubs, is more commonly recog-
nized today as the name of a popular chewing gum company than as one of the franchise’s earliest 
owners.  William Wrigley, who happened to be the head of the Wrigley gum enterprise, purchased the 
Cubs from Charles Weeghman in 1918, and made numerous improvements to the park while also chang-
ing the name from Cubs Park to Wrigley Field.  See SMITH, supra note 8, at 128 (“The gum squire 
lowered the field, put a scoreboard in left, and double-decked the grandstands.”). 
 95 SMITH, supra note 8, at 316 (explaining that the Anhauser-Busch beer company owned the St. 
Louis Cardinals by the early 1960’s, at which point the corporation pledged $5 million towards the 
building of a new stadium to revive the downtown St. Louis area; after extensive renovations, the park 
was renamed Busch Stadium).  
 96 I intentionally use the term “corporatization” as a literal and figurative derivative of “moderni-
zation,” which has occurred to a great degree in sports over the last 40+ years, ranging from the stadia to 
the development of free agency and salary caps.  The influx of corporate participation in sports is but 
one of the many evolutions and revolutions that have occurred throughout this period of modernization.      
532 FIU Law Review [4:515 
haps the biggest issue raised by stadium naming practices is that of trade-
mark and trade use rights, as the venue and its corporate namesake come to 
require similar protections of the same general trademark or name.  As de-
fined by the Lanham Act,97 a trademark: 
includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination the-
reof -- (1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide in-
tention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal reg-
ister established by this Act, to identify and distinguish his or her 
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold 
by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is 
unknown.98 
The spectrum of trademark classes consist of generic, descriptive, sug-
gestive, and arbitrary or fanciful, in the ascending order of protection af-
forded and likely eligibility for Lanham Act protection.99  While there is 
much left to interpretation on the borders of these classes, the general 
guideline in assessing whether a mark is to be considered suggestive (and 
therefore entitled to trademark protection) or merely descriptive (and there-
fore not) is whether an “imaginative leap” is required by the consumer to 
connect the mark to a particular service or good.100  While the standard rule 
of trademark is that the mark holder must use the mark in commerce to ac-
quire the appurtenant rights,101 there is one particular exception that has 
created a large carve-out to the rule.  A product, service, or other mark may 
come to be known by consumers and the general public at large by a name 
other than the officially registered trademark, thus creating other valuable 
trademarks via public use.102       
Of course, the millions of dollars paid for the opportunity to have a 
corporate name associated with a professional stadium would be money 
poorly spent, without one of the most important legal rights associated with 
intellectual property and trademark: exclusivity.  There would be no reason 
to spend for stadium naming rights if other companies could also portray 
themselves as being associated with the franchise or facility.  Such situa-
tions have arisen in the past, requiring courts to determine the level of ex-
clusivity the right in a facility’s name carries.   
In Facility Management of Louisiana v. Continental Hotel Property,103 
the operators of the Louisiana Superdome104 sought to permanently enjoin 
                                                                                                                           
 97 15 U.S.C. §§ 1111-1129 (2007). 
 98 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2007).  
 99 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 100 Thornburg, supra note 11, at 340. 
 101 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also Thornburg, supra note 11, at 341. 
 102 Id. at 341. 
 103 Facility Mgmt. of La., Inc., v. Cont’l Hotel Prop., Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1316 (E.D. La. 1994). 
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the defendant from using the Superdome name in connection with a motel, 
called the Superdome Motor Inn.105  In determining whether defendant im-
pinged on the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District’s right to the 
Superdome name, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that the 
plaintiffs meet the general standard for trademark infringement— namely 
that “the use of a trademark is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to 
deceive as to the source of origin of the goods or services involved in the 
use.”106  Instead, the Facility Management court determined that the legisla-
ture clearly intended that the Stadium and Exposition District have exclu-
sive use of the term “Superdome.”107  While the court did not directly ad-
dress whether the Inn actually caused a likelihood of confusion, Facility 
Management does demonstrate that a substantial level of deference is given 
to the owner of a specific trademark in a naming right, particularly when 
explicitly stated by the legislature. 
In negotiating naming rights deals, the parties “typically agree not only 
to make reasonable efforts to use the name in facility identification, but also 
facilitate media usage in all communications.”108  Such clauses provide an 
even greater marketing network for the corporate namesake than would 
otherwise be provided.  Other agreements typically negotiated into deals are 
those related to the extent of visibility the corporate name receives: in the 
most beneficial contracts for naming rights holders, the company name may 
appear everywhere from the playing surface to the napkins at the conces-
sion stand.109 
IV. WHO’S TAB IS IT ANYWAY? 
“That's as good as money, sir. Those are I.O.U.'s.”110 
A.  Financing Stadiums 
While cities and their fans enjoy the presence of sports teams, the en-
thusiasm tends to fade when talk turns to building new home stadiums.  
One common gripe shared by citizens and politicians alike is the disinge-
nuous perception wealthy owners create by asking for financial assistance 
                                                                                                                           
 104 The Superdome is the home of the NFL’s New Orleans Saints and the NCAA Division-1A 
Sugar Bowl. 
 105 Facility Mgmt of La., Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1316. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Larry M. McCarthy & Richard Irwin, Names in Lights: Corporate Purchase of Sport Facility 
Naming Rights, CYBER-JOURNAL OF SPORTS MARKETING, available at http://catalogue.ausport.gov.au 
/fulltext/1998/cjsm/v2n3/mccarthyirwin23.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 109 Id. (providing an example of extensive brand imaging: the United Center in Chicago, where the 
United name appears on “employee uniforms, napkins, plates, trash cans, letterhead, and drinking 
cups.”).  
 110 DUMB AND DUMBER (New Line Cinema 1994). 
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toward building a stadium from which the benefits—namely profits and 
other revenue streams—will largely be enjoyed by the franchise.  The gist 
of this argument is that the public should not have to subsidize the costs of 
financing facilities that often require over $500 million to construct, to then 
enjoy only the intangible benefits of the new stadium’s “public purpose” 
service as a location for leisure and entertainment.     
While the state of affairs surrounding stadium finance is replete with 
conflicting interests and divergent viewpoints regarding who should pay, 
the details regarding the methods of funding these facilities are often the 
target of debate as well.  Unfortunately (though not surprisingly), there is 
no single financing avenue that is without its shortcomings.     
In the eyes of many opposed to public stadium subsidization, the main 
culprit is the tax-exempt bond approach, and by extension, the franchise 
owners who unscrupulously take advantage of the regime.  According to 
critics, franchise owners are able to circumvent and exploit existing struc-
tures regarding bond financing and tax exemption, to substantially reduce 
their burden while shifting the bulk of the financing costs to the public sec-
tor.   
The application of lottery proceeds toward financing new stadiums has 
also come under much scrutiny.  Some scholars have argued that a lottery is 
essentially an implicit regressive tax across an entire state, more forcefully 
impacting lower-income individuals who tend to spend more on lotteries, 
but incidentally are less likely to be able to afford to be consumers of sport-
ing event products.111  Redistributing lottery revenue towards financing sta-
diums also inevitably results in a weaker revenue stream for programs al-
ready receiving funds.112  Conversely, others have noted that while there are 
drawbacks incident to the use of lottery proceeds borne by individuals who 
may otherwise not have any connection or interest to the new facility, the 
success of such an approach can be determined by the willful participation 
in state lotteries, as opposed to passive participation via tax increases.113     
Much like lottery revenue redistribution, tax increases also have vari-
ous shortcomings which detractors of public stadium subsidization cite as 
being problematic to equitable public financing solutions.  To be sure, many 
stadiums have successfully and willfully been financed with the help of 
general sales taxes.114  However, the main argument against such measures, 
especially increases in local sales taxes, is that these taxes are overbroad.115  
                                                                                                                           
 111 Goodman, supra note 24, at 196-97. 
 112 Id.  Many states, such as Florida, target public school systems as a beneficiary of lottery reve-
nue.  
 113 Senkiewicz, supra note 11. 
 114 One such example is the ballpark at Arlington, home of the MLB Texas Rangers.  See Good-
man, supra note 24, at 194-95.  
 115 Id. 
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By their very nature, these broad-sweeping sales tax increases are borne by 
the entire citizenry, while a much smaller fraction of the population actually 
enjoys the new stadium’s entertainment benefits.116  The imposition of gen-
eral sales taxes, opponents argue, requires the entirety of the taxpaying po-
pulous to bear the burden of financing the stadium or arena, regardless of 
whether they even want the facility there at all or will make use of it.117  
This is especially true where the venue is to be constructed as part of a 
downtown or urban revitalization project, as existing residents in these 
areas tend to be lower income earners who are in essence financially prec-
luded from attending games even if they wanted to despite having the facili-
ty a short distance away and having footed the bill for a portion of its 
costs.118  As a result, these poorer citizens tend to be disproportionately im-
pacted by the tax measure.119   
Other tax-based revenue generating measures such as hotel and tourist 
taxes seem to relieve some of the financial burden caused by public subsi-
dizations, a particularly attractive option in cities generating a great deal of 
economic revenue from tourism.  A prime example is Miami, where nearly 
$150 million of the costs for the NBA’s Miami Heat’s new arena was fi-
nanced by hotel and other tourism-related taxes,120 and the Florida Marlins 
newly-approved stadium agreement, which includes $297 million in Mi-
ami-Dade County tourist tax revenues to be used for financing the new 
ballpark.121  Nonetheless, the same complaints of general local sales taxes 
are also levied at tourist taxes, namely that they do not raise the revenues 
from those that will enjoy the benefits of the new facility unless those indi-
viduals take in a stadium event as part of their visit.122  These tourist taxes 
also possibly have the negative effect of deterring potential visitors because 
of the tax increases.123  Thus, it appears that a common chink in the armor of 
lottery and tax revenue-generating methods is that the size of the population 
bearing the costs for the facility is much larger than the size of the popula-
tion that will utilize it and reap its benefits.   
Perhaps the most infamous recent example of financing issues affect-
ing the development of a new sports facility is the New York Sports and 
Convention Center in New York City.  Also dubbed the West Side Stadium, 
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the project called for a new 75,000 seat retractable-roofed stadium for the 
NFL’s New York Jets, as well as a massive convention center capable of 
accommodating various other events.124  The facility, estimated to cost up-
wards of $1 billion to construct,125 was to be erected in the Far West Side of 
Manhattan, on the Hudson Rail Yard grounds.  The project was to also be 
the center piece of New York’s bid to host the 2012 Summer Olympics.126  
Despite support from New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg and New 
York State governor George Pataki,127 the endeavor was eventually de-
feated.  Opposition to the project was as strong as its support, particularly at 
the local level, where there was much consternation over the $600 million 
public subsidy required to bring the complex to fruition,128 half to be funded 
by the city via tax exempt bonds and half by the state.129  As with many 
other stadium proposals,130 the Sports and Convention Center was to be the 
crown jewel of a vast economic growth project, in this case aimed at devel-
oping the Far West Side, deemed Manhattan’s “last great frontier.”131   
However revitalizing and ground-breaking the project was to have 
been, it was met with heavy resistance at both the local and state level.  
Various workers’ unions and other political groups believed the enormous 
cost to subsidize the facility’s construction could be better spent else-
where.132  Additionally, Madison Square Garden (MSG)— the home venue 
for the NBA’s New York Knicks, WNBA’s New York Liberty, and NHL’s 
New York Rangers— and its affiliated commercial entities also denounced 
the plan.133  Some commentators have suggested that MSG’s opposition to 
the plan was borne out of a concern with having a new state-of-the-art 
complex with which to directly compete for hosting events (MSG is also 
located in Manhattan’s West Side).134  Also of concern would be the con-
struction’s adverse effects on the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), 
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New York’s public transportation agency, which owns the rail yards over 
which the West Side complex was to be built.135 
B.  Local Influence and Public Debate 
Despite the ever-increasing emphasis placed on the “business of 
sports” and the necessity of a cash-cow state of the art facility as an integral 
component to franchise success, there are numerous variables emanating 
from individual scenarios that often become pivotal factors in how the sta-
dium financing debate plays out in a particular city.  Indeed, professional 
sports teams often act as lightning rods and rallying points for a city, enrich-
ing the community in ways that do not show up on a financial report by 
giving citizens who may otherwise have nothing in common a shared inter-
est and loyalty.  The ultimate target consumers for franchises are their fan 
bases, and as such the dynamics between the citizens of the community (i.e. 
fans of the team and those that foot the bill for at least part of the facility), 
the franchise, and the municipal government require a subtle tightrope act.  
Many of these “soft variables,” such as the desire of elected officials to 
remain politically popular and franchises seeking to appease the fan base, 
substantially affect the manner in which these matters are decided.  These 
variables manifest themselves not on balance sheets, but through the media, 
political discourse, and other local channels.   
Supporters of public stadium and arena subsidization frequently prof-
fer studies demonstrating that the new facility will bring with it copious 
economic benefits to the area in the form of greater revenue and increased 
job opportunities,136 and other assessments of “spending increase[s] asso-
ciated with the stadium.”137  According to some analysts, every dollar spent 
on professional sports increases household income by seventeen cents and 
another dollar and seventy-five cents is realized by the economy;138 seventy-
six jobs are also created for every million dollars spent on professional 
sports.139  From a non-economic perspective, former players themselves 
have also noted that new stadiums increase fan interest and attendance fig-
ures.140        
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Just as frequently, however, those opposed to stadium subsidization 
cite contrasting studies showing that these economic benefits are grossly 
overstated and often nearly nonexistent.141  This usually includes the argu-
ment that any real economic benefits realized by the presence of a new sta-
dium are miniscule in comparison to the heavy cost burden suffered by the 
tax paying populous en masse, and governments can reap much better re-
turns on their investments if it is jobs and other economic stimuli they seek 
to create.142  Footing the bill for the majority (and some cases entirety) of 
the new facility is viewed as a fleecing of the citizenry, allowing private 
owners to reap the vast majority of the economic benefits the new stadium 
creates.143  Moreover, the taxpayers who essentially bear the brunt of public 
subsidization “do not enjoy a proportionate share of the associated benefits” 
new stadiums are supposed to create.144  As such, there is a constant back-
and-forth played out in the political realm, almost always trickling out into 
the public. 
 
1.  Relocation Threats, Public Factions, Political Votes, and Legal 
   Challenges  
One common thread, particularly in small and mid-market cities, is to 
play up the “big league” national perception the city can gain by keeping or 
luring a professional franchise by constructing a new stadium.145  By shap-
ing the community’s self esteem around its relationship with the profession-
al franchise, stadium supporters are often able to squeeze new facilities out 
of contentious situations.146  Additionally, these groups also appeal to local 
business leaders— who often have the potential to be major players in get-
ting a new stadium deal done— with the vision of a more attractive com-
munity to outsiders, couching a new stadium as a feather in the city’s cap 
when it comes to recruiting executives and other business talent.147     
Other factors such as the franchise’s perceived status or goodwill in 
the community also play a role in the public’s enthusiasm regarding the 
subsidization of a new facility.  These issues can play just as important a 
role in the final decision as to whether a subsidized stadium plan will sur-
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vive.  For instance, in Poe v. Hillsborough County,148 the Florida Supreme 
Court granted the use of public bonds to construct the Raymond James Sta-
dium in Tampa for the NFL’s Buccaneers.  In its decision, the court rea-
soned that “the Buccaneers instill civic pride and camaraderie into the 
community and that the Buccaneer games and other stadium events also 
serve a commendable public purpose by enhancing the community image 
on a nationwide basis and providing recreation, entertainment and cultural 
activities to its citizens.”149   
One such example of voraciously contested stadium proposals is that 
of the Florida Marlins.  The Marlins, having begun MLB play in 1993, just 
recently gained official approval for a new ballpark, capping a decade-long 
battle to obtain a baseball-only retractable-roofed facility in South Flori-
da.150  On March 19, 2009, the City of Miami Commission voted on a deal 
between the Marlins, the City of Miami, and Miami-Dade County,151 result-
ing in a 3-2 approval of the agreement.152  County commissioners, passing 
the proposal by a 9-4 vote, echoed the city’s approval.153  The county deci-
sion proved to be much more tenuous than the county vote, complete with 
histrionics from one dissenting commissioner who tore apart his copy of the 
agreement to express his disapproval.154  While such a dramatic demonstra-
tion may be a bit hyperbolic, it underscores the underlying passion of de-
bates over multi-million dollar expenditures for new sports facilities. 
A common attack levied at the manner in which new stadium agree-
ments are consummated is that such agreements can be reached without 
involving the voting public.155  The passed Marlins proposal is no exception, 
as evidenced by the proposal-tearing commissioner’s arguments against the 
“unfairness of the negotiations and how it was kept from the public,”156 
given that the proposed agreement for the Marlins’ new stadium did not go 
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to a voter referendum.157  Similar situations have transpired in Pennsylvania, 
where four new professional sports facilities have been approved and 
opened since 1999 in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.158  Some commentators 
have argued that particularly in Pittsburgh, creative maneuvering by the 
city’s political and corporate communities—known as “local growth coali-
tions”159—facilitated speedy stadium construction despite a stark absence of 
voter support.160  These collaborative efforts can often have dispositive ef-
fects on public policy decisions, even in the face of heavy popular senti-
ment opposing the directives: 
At heart, a growth coalition is an institutional alliance between the lo-
cal corporate community and the local government, although the spe-
cific form of government involvement may vary.  The local corporate 
community generally runs the growth coalition, which might include 
media, religious, and labor organizations (in supporting roles) but 
rarely includes a city’s sports teams.  Local growth coalitions have an 
inordinate influence over public policy and use that influence to serve 
their parochial interests, although they may claim they are pursuing 
the overall community good.  Policies for advocating public dollars 
for sports stadiums provide just one example of this bias.161 
Despite nearly leaving South Florida—the franchise was exceedingly 
close to relocating to San Antonio, Texas in 2006162—the favorable com-
mission decisions on the Marlins’ new stadium does not signal the end of 
the franchise’s concerns.  Details such as the Orange Bowl site receiving 
“an environmental clean bill of health”163 and “[d]isputes over whether the 
county or city police department will earn [the] off-duty pay”164 afforded to 
officers working at games, have been settled.  Norman Braman’s lawsuit,165 
which challenged not only the Marlins’ new stadium agreement, but also 
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the entire overarching three billion dollar public works deal, has been dis-
posed of.166  Yet, the new stadium is still in limbo, awaiting a final vote by 
city and county commissioners in March 2009 after a February 2009 ses-
sion ended in a 2-2 tie.   
C.  Stadium Naming Rights Pitfalls: Welcome to the Stadium Formerly       
Known As…  
Emblazoning a name across the facade of a major sporting venue may 
certainly be an attractive marketing venture for a corporation, but for both 
the namesakes and the franchises and facility owners that enter into such 
deals, there are myriad concerns as well.  With the signing of a long-term, 
multi-million dollar naming rights agreement comes the potential for signif-
icant legal issues to arise, particularly if either party becomes unable to 
perform their end of the contract or otherwise seeks to escape the agree-
ment.   
The worst-case scenario for parties to a naming rights agreement is if 
the corporation becomes insolvent: such was the case with the former Joe 
Robbie Stadium in Miami Gardens, Florida, home to the Miami Dolphins 
and Florida Marlins.  Originally named after the former Dolphins owner 
who privately funded the entire $115 million facility in the mid-1980’s, the 
facility was renamed Pro Player Park (and later changed to Pro Player Sta-
dium) following an agreement with Pro Player, the sports apparel division 
of Fruit of the Loom.  Pro Player filed for bankruptcy in 1999, creating a 
lame duck of a name until 2005, when the naming rights agreement expired 
and the facility’s name was changed to Dolphins Stadium—only to be 
changed once again, this time to Dolphin Stadium.   
Of course, no discussion of stadium naming agreement shortcomings 
can be had without the proverbial “poster boy” for such deals gone wrong: 
the Houston Astros of MLB.  Enron, a Houston-based energy corporation 
and a leader in the local business community, spearheaded an effort to con-
struct a new publicly-funded stadium to replace the venerable Astrodome.167  
The Enron-headed task force garnered just enough voter support to approve 
the project, a $625 million retractable-roof downtown stadium, which 
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opened in 2000.168  As has been well documented, in December 2001 Enron 
became the largest corporation ever to file for bankruptcy in the wake of 
one of the most stunning corporate scandals in American history.169  This 
created a nightmare for the Astros, who in the span of less than two years 
went from playing in a state-of-the art facility branded with the name of one 
of Houston’s most prized corporations to having a serious contractual mess 
on its hands.  Despite the Astros not having committed any breach of the 
naming rights contract,170 the franchise eventually decided it would essen-
tially pay to make its relationship with Enron go away, negotiating a $2.1 
million buyback of the stadium naming rights from the bankrupt giant.171  
After a brief stint as Astros Field, the franchise sold the stadium naming 
rights to Houston-based Coca-Cola subsidiary Minute Maid Company.172    
With the rise of the dot-com era at the turn of the millennium, many 
burgeoning companies sought to expand their brand visibility by acquiring 
naming rights to sporting venues in various locales.  The coalescence of the 
dot-com bubble’s peak and the increasing popularity of stadium naming 
rights agreements created a perfect storm for professional sports franchises, 
which were now faced with the glowing potential of a greater number of 
brands vying for the naming rights to a finite number of facilities.  The re-
sult was predictable: from 1998-2000 the sports landscape experienced an 
unprecedented number of technology-based companies entering into nam-
ing rights agreements, ranging from established players in the technology 
industry to nascent brands seeking to jump headfirst into the e-marketplace 
with high visibility advertising strategies.173  Of course, unforeseen at the 
time was that the dot-come “bubble” would burst shortly thereafter in 2001, 
leaving in its wake a veritable mess for naming rights holders.   
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Among the most infamous examples of dot-com naming rights de-
bacles is PSINet, which in January 1999 agreed with the NFL’s Baltimore 
Ravens to a twenty year, $105.5 million naming rights contract for the Ra-
ven’s home stadium.174  At the time of the 1999 agreement, PSINet’s finan-
cial picture was bright and the company was trading at $51 per share;175 by 
April 2001, however, the company was trading at $0.18 per share.176  De-
spite being founded before the dot-com boom, PSINet nonetheless became 
a casualty of the tech-bubble bursting when it filed for Chapter 11 Bank-
ruptcy in 2001,177 leaving the Ravens in limbo until the rights were acquired 
by M&T Bank.178   
Similarly, in 2002 the NFL’s New England Patriots found themselves 
in a precarious situation with the tech-based namesake of their new facility.  
The franchise contracted with College Marketing Group Information 
(CMGI) in 2000 to a then-record-tying $114 million naming rights agree-
ment, under which CMGI was to pay the team $7.6 million per year over 
fifteen years for the rights to “CMGI Field.”179   
By the time the new stadium was completed however, the dot-com 
bubble had burst and taken CMGI’s viability as a naming rights sponsor 
with it.  The company’s stock had fallen precipitously, from trading at $160 
per share when the stadium agreement was made in 2000 to $2 per share at 
the time of the stadium’s opening in 2002.180  Rather than face the ominous 
possibility of bankruptcy, CMGI backed out of the naming rights deal a 
month before the Patriot’s first home game at the new facility as part of a 
massive corporate restructuring plan in an effort to salvage the company’s 
existence.181  This last minute desertion left the franchise scrambling for a 
new corporate sponsor, as well as having to remove any remaining vestiges 
of the CMGI Field name.182  Grooming product manufacturer Gillette 
stepped into CMGI’s shoes, reaching a fifteen year agreement of its own 
with the Patriots for the name “Gillette Stadium.”183 
In addition to the wariness the dot-com era has created for franchises 
seeking naming rights partners, owners and leagues must also be aware of 
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the possibility of mergers and acquisitions involving potential stadium na-
mesakes, “particularly where a particular brand or company may be sub-
sumed in a merger.”184 
Despite such tales of disaster, other franchises’ forays into naming 
rights agreements during the dot-com era have remained stable and lucra-
tive.  Such is the case with the NFL’s San Diego Chargers.  The Chargers’ 
home field, originally named San Diego Stadium and later Jack Kent Sta-
dium in honor of a locally beloved and influential sportswriter, came in 
need of a major expansion and renovation project in the late 1990’s.185  Iron-
ically, though much to the chagrin of local fans who considered it sacrile-
gious to remove the beloved Kent as the stadium’s namesake, the Chargers 
– and the city of San Diego – found that corporate involvement would pro-
vide the answer to funding the expansion project.  As such, in 1997 the 
franchise entered into a naming rights agreement with local telecommunica-
tions company Qualcomm totaling $18 million and running through 2017.186  
Thus, while selling stadium naming rights is not a foolproof practice by any 
stretch of the imagination, with prudent planning and a quality corporate 
partner sports franchises can reap extensive benefits from such agreements.       
V.  TIME TO CALL IN THE RELIEVER: BRINGING CORPORATIONS TO THE 
PLATE? 
-“Surely you can't be serious.”  
-“I am serious... and don't call me Shirley.”187 
Despite perpetual efforts to quell the storm of controversy surrounding 
stadium and other sporting facility finance, there seems to be little headway 
being made toward assuaging the concerns of the parties involved, particu-
larly those in and representing the public sphere.  While both the “corpora-
tization” of stadium names and allocation of financing burdens are sore 
subjects, perhaps a solution can be reached on the financing front by bring-
ing an unlikely potential ally into the picture.  This section will discuss var-
ious solutions to mitigating concerns inherent in the stadium financing di-
lemma, ranging from simply tweaking existing applicable legislation, to 
more uncharted waters and creative collaboration efforts.  More specifical-
ly, the idea of bringing the often-maligned owners of these new naming 
rights, i.e. the corporations, to the stadium financing “bargaining table” as 
third-party intermediaries, may provide a quite unorthodox but amenable 
solution to municipalities struggling to foot the bill for new facilities.  
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Doing so could potentially alleviate the costs of bringing a new stadium to 
fruition, particularly those borne by the public sector.    
A. The Odd Couple  
The most intriguing – though perhaps most cavalier as well – potential 
solution for cities and team owners involves an often-demonized player in 
the modern sporting world: the corporations engaged in the purchase of 
increasingly lucrative stadium and arena naming rights. 
In the wake of the Enron scandal, which among other things left the 
Houston Astros with a defunct namesake for its ballpark,188 there may be an 
understandable wariness surrounding long-term facility naming rights 
agreements – particularly in the current economic climate of turmoil and 
recession.  One potential manner in which these concerns can be made 
more palatable to all parties involved is to engage in business with a well-
established national corporation in a low risk industry, so as to minimize 
risk of future insolvency on the part of the stadium namesake.  One such 
example is the aviation industry, which has enjoyed a rich history of nam-
ing rights with professional basketball facilities.  United,189 Delta,190 and 
American191 Airlines are but three such corporations to have partnered with 
NBA franchises in naming rights deals.192  American Airlines, whose name 
adorns the home venues of both the Dallas Mavericks and Miami Heat, 
received an unexpected boon in 2006 when those two teams met each other 
in the NBA Finals.193  In what was the first instance of a corporation holding 
the naming rights to both facilities hosting a league championship event, the 
                                                                                                                           
 188 At the time of Enron’s collapse, the Astros’ home field was named Enron Field.  It has since 
been renamed Tropicana Field. 
 189 The United Center opened in 1994, replacing the Chicago Center as the Chicago Bulls’ home 
arena.  United Airlines currently pays $1.8 million per year for the naming rights; the agreement expires 
in 2014.  See Stadium naming rights, ESPN Sports Business, available at http://espn.go.com/ 
sportsbusiness/s/stadiumnames.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 190 Id.  The Utah Jazz played its home games in the Delta Center from 1991 until November 20, 
2006, when a new naming rights agreement was reached with Energy Solutions, a Utah-based corpora-
tion dealing in waste management and processing.    
 191 American Airlines agreed to pay an estimated $42 million over 20 years for the naming rights 
to the brand-new home arena of the Miami Heat in 1996, which opened as the American Airlines Arena.  
See Major League Sport Stadium/Arena Referendum’s [sic] (since 1990), 
http://law.marquette.edu/s3/site/images/sports/referenda.pdf.  American Airlines pays $2.1 million per 
year for its Miami naming rights, and will also pay an average of $6.5 million per year through 2031 for 
the naming rights to the American Airlines Center, home to the Dallas Mavericks.  See Stadium naming 
rights, supra note 189.  
 192 While airlines continue to be popular choices for facility naming rights deals, it should be noted 
that these corporations and the aviation industry in general, have seen their strength weakened a bit in 
the wake of September 11th, 2001. 
 193 An All-American (Airlines) Finals, available at http://www.nba.com/finals2006/ 
arenas_060608.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
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2006 NBA Finals generated what was calculated to be $9 million per game 
in revenue for American Airlines.194   
While selecting a corporation with which to create a naming rights re-
lationship presents an important decision in itself, the financial structure of 
the agreement is also immensely critical.  In typical naming rights con-
tracts, corporations agree to a total contract price for the facility naming 
rights in exchange for the exclusive naming rights for a particular amount 
of time, the total of which is to be paid in yearly installments over the life 
of the agreement.  While fairly uncomplicated, this agreement structure 
could be altered to greatly facilitate the payment of not only naming rights, 
but of a new facility altogether.   
Essentially, this is where corporations can be brought to the bargaining 
table as third parties, directly contributing to the cost of financing the new 
stadium or arena.  Rather than having the consideration paid for the naming 
rights pocketed as profit, franchises and facility operators should consider 
redistributing the naming-rights payment to help fund the actual construc-
tion of the stadium itself.  With naming rights deals easily exceeding $25 
million dollars over the course of the agreement’s duration, and sometimes 
exceeding $40 million, reallocating a portion of the funds generated would 
have a definite beneficial effect of alleviating at least some of the financial 
burden on the other two parties to the financing deal.  Conversely, corpora-
tions could be requested to also provide a financial stipend toward the costs 
of constructing the new stadium.  While these companies would likely bris-
tle at the idea of paying more for stadium rights than they already do, and 
franchises would likewise be leery of sacrificing a heftier bottom line in 
exchange for cheaper construction costs, the damage to their own respective 
wallets can be mitigated as well. 
One method of recouping lost revenues is to increase the use of “sup-
plemental advertising” throughout the league or franchise product.  Sports 
leagues and franchises could sell advertising space on uniforms, not unlike 
European soccer clubs and NASCAR race teams.  While sports purists cer-
tainly would be up in arms at even the notion of such a suggestion, the ben-
efits of such a shift would arguably far outweigh the perceived sacrilege of 
having a corporate logo on a uniform.  Uniform advertising would allow the 
corporation to recoup some of its losses caused by redirecting naming rights 
capital to financing the facility’s construction, while also extending the im-
age-branding link between the corporation and the franchise to road games 
as well.  Uniform branding has been a staple of European soccer advertising 
                                                                                                                           
 194 American Airlines Hopes NBA Finals Provide Lift, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Jun. 12, 
2006, available at http://pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/rss/s_457607.html (last visited Apr. 5, 
2007).  The 2006 Finals lasted six of a possible seven games.  It should also be noted that the decisions 
to purchase the arena naming rights in Dallas and Miami were not made in a vacuum: Dallas is Ameri-
can Airlines’ largest hub, and Miami the airline’s third-largest.    
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for years with much success, and while American sports fans may bristle at 
the notion of having their favorite player become a walking billboard, 
league policy-makers could set specific guidelines and restrictions on uni-
form branding, such as limiting the location to a small logo on a jersey 
sleeve or the back of a helmet.  However, such a decision to implement 
uniform marketing would almost certainly have to be made league-wide.       
Moreover, the concept of in-game marketing is actually not foreign to 
American professional sports leagues, as at least one league has already 
experimented with the idea in the past.  Major League Baseball flirted with 
the idea of advertising the film Spider Man 2 on its bases during the week-
end of June 11-13, 2004, only to scrap the idea in the wake of fans voicing 
their displeasure with the plan.195  While some fans would vehemently op-
pose the influx of in-game advertising as another encroachment of commer-
cialization on tradition, it is inarguable that professional sports in the twen-
ty-first century have become increasingly expensive products to create and 
operate as well.  Salary caps, free agency, and player endorsements are but 
three of the phenomena that have dulled the luster of the “good old days” in 
professional sports today.  The concomitant circumstances around the 
games are becoming ever more complex, requiring constantly evolving 
examination of legal and other issues, and perhaps such comparatively mi-
nor on-field encroachments must be made to keep up with the increased 
capital required to succeed in today’s professional sports universe.   
In lieu of bringing the advertising onto the playing surface, franchises 
can also opt to grant stadium naming rights to one corporation for a larger 
fee, while reaching multiple smaller agreements with companies in other 
industries for other services.  The revenue generated by these agreements 
can then be put toward financing the facility.   
1.  “Structurally integrated” naming rights sponsorship:  Expanding on 
the PETCO Park model 
Generating stadium construction revenue via increased advertising and 
corporate sponsorship presence, while a surefire way to raise more capital 
with which to fund a new facility, may likely be met with stiff opposition by 
leagues and fan bases.  With this in mind, parties to the stadium finance 
conundrum should also be looking to “think outside the box” when it comes 
to utilizing their corporate sponsors in a manner that would mitigate the 
costs of constructing a new state-of-the-art stadium or arena, while also 
providing additional or unique facets to the event-going experience. 
One of the most unique and intriguing professional stadium designs is 
San Diego’s PETCO Park, home to MLB’s San Diego Padres, and located 
                                                                                                                           
 195 Brad Rock, Money Can Buy Ad Spot on Me, DESERET MORNING NEWS, May 12, 2004, at D01. 
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in a historic San Diego factory warehouse district.  During the course of 
planning PETCO, the city and stadium design team were faced with the 
challenge of potentially having to tear down the historic Western Metal 
Supply Co. building, a fixture in the area since 1910.196  Rather than raze 
the historical structure to make way for the new ballpark, an agreement was 
reached between the Padres, the city of San Diego, and historical preserva-
tion groups to integrate the Western Metal building into the ballpark’s de-
sign.197  PETCO opened its doors in 2004, with the Western Metal building 
towering over left field: in fact, the southeast corner of the structure actual-
ly functions as the left field foul pole.198  Far from being just a historical 
relic in a modern-day big league ballpark, the Western Metal building was 
renovated for the stadium project and now includes bleacher seating and 
standing room on the roof, twelve party suites, the Padres team store, and a 
restaurant with a dining terrace.199  The end result of the Western building’s 
use represents a brilliant balance of San Diego’s history and modern sport-
ing entertainment luxuries. 
While the Western Metal building incorporation was the first of its 
kind for a sporting facility,200 this ingenious design strategy can be built 
upon to be used in situations beyond those involving historical preservation.  
Whereas the Western Metal building was no longer of any use to its name-
sake company and was a historical landmark, the idea of physically inte-
grating a corporate building into a facility’s design could be built upon to 
create stadiums featuring fully-functional physical space for the namesake 
corporation’s use. 
By integrating a commercially functional structure into a ballpark’s 
design, corporations holding stadium naming rights can become viable third 
parties in stadium finance negotiations.  The perfect storm of such a scena-
rio would involve two players.  The first would be a professional sports 
franchise seeking to move into a new facility as opposed to renovating its 
current one.  The second would be a corporation, preferably of the estab-
lished national or influential local variety, seeking to move into a new 
building or expand its operations into a city with a professional sports fran-
chise.  Considering the fact that the corporation would be paying for its new 
office or other building regardless of its location, enticing it to partner with 
                                                                                                                           
 196 See San Diego Ballpark Builders Tops Out Petco Park, Clark Construction, Mar. 5, 2003, 
available at http://www.clarkconstruction.com/Portfolio/ViewPressRelease.asp?prid=94&Category 
=&CategoryName= (“Clark Construction”) (last visited Apr. 5, 2008). 
 197 Id. 
 198 San Diego Padres 2007 Media Guide, available at http://www.mlb.com/pressbox/downloads 
/y2007/sd/petco_park.pdf. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Clark Construction, supra note 196. 
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the franchise in fusing their two operational facilities together would bring 
with it a plethora of benefits for both parties involved. 
For the franchise and public, the cost of the company’s building, en-
tirely paid for by the corporation, would be incorporated into the cost to 
build the stadium.  Depending on the amount of land the building requires, 
this could result in a fair-sized reduction of the otherwise publicly subsi-
dized portion of the facility’s construction.  By increasing the third party 
corporation’s interest in the success of the project, less of a financial burden 
would ultimately be placed on the public, which is where the bulk of the 
concern surrounding stadium financing rests.  Additionally, the end-product 
would be a highly distinct design, one which would have the potential to 
draw customers to the stadium who would otherwise not have an interest in 
the game or event taking place, but who nonetheless are interested in taking 
in the unique experience.   
Such a structurally-symbiotic relationship brings important potential 
benefits to the corporation as well.  There is perhaps no stronger way to 
advertise a corporate brand using sports as to use a team’s facility not only 
as a supersized billboard, but as a vehicle to integrate a fully-functional 
office or other building into the actual facility’s architecture.  This maxi-
mum branding would raise the exposure benefits of corporate naming rights 
to higher level, while reducing construction costs for the franchise and pub-
lic.201  Additionally, such a large-scale partnership would result in an in-
creased perception of goodwill among the national and local community 
and further aid in the development of the brand’s identity.202  With the aver-
age professional basketball arena seating upwards of 18,000 spectators, and 
some NFL stadiums capable of accommodating over 70,000, the presence 
of a namesake corporation’s actual building would create a very tangible 
connection between the consumer base and the company for which the fa-
cility is made.  While corporations may hesitate to increase their financial 
roles in stadium naming agreements, doing so would not likely run afoul of 
other corporate purposes, as the greater participation and investment in the 
new stadium can be perceived as providing a significant corporate benefit 
in the form of increased advertising and fostering of goodwill within the 
community.203  Such an arrangement would certainly increase the number of 
individuals that consume the namesake brand, as the company would essen-
                                                                                                                           
 201 For more on the extent the impact of naming rights agreements on corporate visibility and 
exposure, see, e.g., Fraas, supra note 20 (Marine Midland Bank estimates that their name was "men-
tioned or shown "hundreds of millions of times'" in the first three months after the opening of Marine 
Midland Arena, home of the NHL's Buffalo Sabres).  
 202 For a deeper look into the considerations and other factors that go into corporate sponsorship 
sports relationships, see generally Anne M. Wall, Sports Marketing and the Law: Protecting Proprietary 
Interests in Sports Entertainment Events, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 77 (1996). 
 203 See generally A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 585 (N.J. 1953) (addressing the 
issue of corporate goodwill within the scope of charitable gifts). 
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tially be bringing its product or service to an already-captive audience 
numbering in the tens of thousands.   
At the heart of the stadium finance debate is the argument that munici-
palities should not have to subsidize the majority of the cost of constructing 
new high-end sports facilities for the benefit of wealthy franchises and 
owners.  While professional sports has become a world of high stakes, high 
dollar business, the term “wealthy” as applied to franchises is still a relative 
one, as even a team worth hundreds of millions of dollars can still be finan-
cially handicapped when compared to the rest of the league.  Corporate 
naming rights holders with increased participation in the design and financ-
ing of new stadiums and arenas could become a major ally to these finan-
cially weaker franchises, who would otherwise struggle to get new stadiums 
built in the face of increasing political and popular opposition to the public 
subsidization of facilities.204  Consumer services corporations such as Car-
nival or Office Depot are particularly intriguing, as a retail outpost could 
also be integrated into a project in addition to a corporate building.  These 
centers would sweeten the pot even further for the corporation entering into 
this fully integrated naming rights agreement, as the tens of thousands of 
fans attending each game would also have a travel planning center or office 
supply store on the premises.  This would present an opportunity for more 
direct increased revenues to the stadium’s namesake, as individuals attend-
ing the game could also purchase the company’s products on site, further 
increasing the visibility of the brand to the fan base.   
VI. ONE SIZE FITS ALL? 
Given the groundbreaking nature of increasing potential stadium na-
mesakes’ roles in financing new stadiums, there will certainly be new fron-
tiers, legal and otherwise, such an arrangement would create.  One potential 
issue is whether increased corporate participation in the funding and opera-
tion of a facility would negatively impact the stadium’s satisfactory public 
purpose and I.R.C. § 141 status.  Current judicial interpretation of the pub-
lic purpose doctrine as applied to stadium financing suggests a strong nexus 
                                                                                                                           
 204 One prime example is MLB’s Florida Marlins, who just recently succeeded in a decade-long, 
well-chronicled battle to have a new stadium built in South Florida.  See supra pp. 32-34; see also 
Florida Senate Professional Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, available at 
http://www.floridatoday.com/assets/pdf/A971629430.PDF.  Multiple large corporations are headquar-
tered in Miami, the largest city in Florida, and the surrounding South Florida area.  Among them is the 
world’s largest cruise line operator (Carnival Corporation) as well as two other cruise companies (Nor-
wegian and Royal Caribbean); security giant ADT Security Systems Inc.; other Fortune-500 companies 
Ryder (a shipping and logistics corporation) and office supply chain Office Depot; Publix Supermarkets; 
and Alienware, a high-performance computer subsidiary of computer-giant Dell.  With such nationally-
recognized South Florida-based corporations, a partnership between one of the brands, the Marlins, and 
the local political community could have potentially helped bridge the long-standing funding gap for a 
new retractable-roofed stadium in downtown Miami.    
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to entertainment and recreation opportunities derived from having a new 
facility at which to host sporting and other events.205  It remains to be seen 
whether a modern sports stadium that also houses a functioning corporate 
structure would change the facility’s public purpose status.   
Additionally, a structural integration approach would likely result in 
greater amounts of the bonds used to finance the stadium to be backed by 
private revenue streams, as the integrated facility would no doubt generate 
revenue for the benefit of the private corporate namesake.  If such revenues 
reach a level greater than the percentages permissible under current § 141 
parameters, those bonds could come in danger of falling within the ambit of 
private activity bonds pursuant to I.R.C. § 141, thereby losing their tax-
exempt interest status.   
Recognizing that the era of the “good old days” of sports has been re-
duced to nostalgic memories, the task for those involved in the modern 
world of the high stakes, high revenue sporting experience becomes creat-
ing the best product possible while avoiding as many of the potential pit-
falls that may arise.  At the forefront of this balancing act is developing a 
method of financing new stadiums and other facilities in a manner that will 
strike a cleaner balance between the private and public interests.   
Regardless of the actual measures taken to bridge the stadium finance 
divide, however, the first and most contentious step in remedying the cur-
rent divide is to overcome the inertia plaguing the situation as it stands to-
day.  Namely, rather than tally every battle waged in the courtroom or legis-
lative branch as a win or loss for one side or the other, professional fran-
chise owners and public taxpayer representatives should seek a more mu-
tually beneficial avenue of resolution.  By shifting the paradigm of stadium 
negotiations from an adversarial approach to a collaborative one where 
problem solving becomes the focus of the parties’ respective efforts, agree-
ments can be reached that strike a more harmonic balance between private 
and public interests.    
More good faith efforts must be made by leagues and franchises to ne-
gotiate financial arrangements with their resident cities, as opposed to the 
common modern practice of engaging in a multi-million dollar version of 
“chicken,” threatening to relocate unless a new publicly-funded home field 
is built.  Conversely, legislators at the state and local level should be more 
willing to cooperate with franchises making legitimate good faith efforts to 
find a solution ameliorable to all involved.  While sports, both at the profes-
sional and amateur levels, are becoming less reminiscent of the bygone eras 
of decades gone by, there still remains an indelible uniqueness to that world 
that is of some moment to the cities in which games are played out.  It is the 
responsibility of the powerbrokers on both sides of the field to showcase 
                                                                                                                           
 205 See supra pp. 538-40. 
552 FIU Law Review [4:515 
that uniqueness in a manner that does not leave either party feeling hung 
out to dry.          
Of course, there is clearly no “one size fits all” solution to stadium fi-
nancing.  What may work for one city may be anathema to the needs and 
goals of another.  This is particularly true when it comes to implementing 
tax and other surcharge methods, as evidenced by the wildly varying suc-
cess of such proposals.  Moreover, increasing the role of corporations or 
otherwise magnifying other commercial components may be met with the 
inertia inherent in the current status quo: as such, it is important to continue 
to explore other avenues.206  
As bleak and contentious as the task may seem for some cities and 
franchises, the most satisfactory resolutions will likely result from creative 
strategizing taking into account each particular situation’s unique features.  
By mixing and matching various available practices, and also considering 
more novel approaches such as greater corporate involvement where possi-
ble, there will hopefully be fewer headaches and more handshakes when it 
comes time for a new House that Your Favorite Player Built (but everyone 
else really paid for). 
 
                                                                                                                           
 206 One such avenue would be altering the existing IRC 10% tests to encourage franchise owners 
to make more altruistic efforts to fund new stadiums.  New stadiums and arenas consistently fail the 
usage test, as more than ten percent of the facility usage goes assuredly is allocated to the private profes-
sional teams that are the facilities’ primary tenants.     
